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Note
Moving Past Preemption: Enhancing the Power
of Local Governments over Hydraulic Fracturing
Rachel A. Kitze*
In the last decade, hydraulic fracturing has transformed
the energy outlook of the United States. Due to improvements
in drilling technology, the United States now has access to 2214
1
trillion cubic feet of natural gas resources, enough to last the
2
country for nearly 100 years. As President Barack Obama
stated, “We, it turns out, are the Saudi Arabia of natural gas.
3
We’ve got a lot of it.” This unprecedented growth in natural
gas production is due to recent advances in a drilling technique
known as hydraulic fracturing (also called fracking,
4
hydrofracking, fracing, or hydraulic fragmentation by one Io5
wan news station ). Deep wells are drilled up to 10,000 feet un* J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2011,
St. Olaf College. Many thanks to Charlie Nauen of Lockridge Grindal Nauen,
P.L.L.P. whose guidance and invaluable insights from years of experience as
both professor and practitioner have immeasurably improved this Note. Thank
you to the wonderful and talented board and staff of the Minnesota Law Review, especially Ally Whelan and Emily Marshall for their dedication and hard
work. I would also like to thank my friends and family, most importantly my
parents, Barb and Phil, and my sister Sara for their love and encouragement.
And my heartfelt thanks to Tim Collins, whose unwavering support and endless patience have sustained me throughout my time in law school. Copyright
© 2013 by Rachel A. Kitze.
1. Mason Inman, Estimates Clash for How Much Natural Gas in the
United States, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Feb. 29, 2012, http://news
.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/03/120301-natural-gas-reservesunited-states/.
2. David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 433 (2013).
3. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President on American-Made Energy (Jan. 26, 2012), available at http://www
.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/01/26/president-obama-discusses
-blueprint-american-made-energy#transcript.
4. See What Is Shale Gas and Why Is It Important?, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/about_shale_gas.cfm (last
updated Dec. 5, 2012) [hereinafter EIA, What Is Shale Gas?].
5. Chris Earl, Moratorium Vote Held Off on Allamakee County Frac
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der the earth’s surface, and then horizontally for miles through
6
the ground. Millions of gallons of water combined with chemicals and sand are then forced into the well under high pressure,
7
causing the rock to crack and allowing natural gas to escape.
Although fracking has opened up access to a century’s
worth of energy, local governments are increasingly concerned
8
about the transformative effect of fracking on communities. On
September 22, 2012, thousands gathered in 150 cities across
five continents to protest the global spread of hydraulic fracturing and voice their concerns about increases in traffic, noise,
water pollution, health risks, and the destruction of the charac9
ter of their local communities.
The rapid expansion of fracking, combined with its negative effects on communities, has led to legal battles between
state and local governments over who has the power to regulate
10
it. At the federal level, there are no comprehensive regula11
tions governing fracking. Consequently, state and local gov12
ernments have primary regulatory authority. Recently, state
governments have sought to increase their control over the
regulatory process by pushing the limits of the doctrine of state
13
preemption. Preemption allows state governments to simultaneously expand their own authority and reduce local governSand Mining, KCRG.COM (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.kcrg.com/news/local/
Moratorium-Vote-Held-Off-on-Allamakee-County-Sand-Mining-189315351
.html.
6. See EIA, What Is Shale Gas?, supra note 4.
7. See id.
8. See, e.g., Local Actions Against Fracking, FOOD & WATER WATCH,
http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/water/fracking/fracking-action-enter/local
-action-documents/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Local Actions] (listing the cities and towns across the country that have implemented ordinances
banning fracking).
9. See Over 150 Organizations to Call for Ban on Hydraulic Fracturing
Through the Global Frackdown, ENEWS PARK FOREST (Sept. 21, 2012, 2:59
PM), http://www.enewspf.com/latest-news/science-a-environmental/36765-over
-150-organizations-to-call-for-ban-on-hydraulic-fracturing-through-the-global
-frackdown.html.
10. See, e.g., Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2012) (deciding a challenge to the state preemption law).
11. See Spence, supra note 2, at 447.
12. See id.
13. See, e.g., 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3301–3309 (2013), available at http://
www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/PDF/58/58.PDF. However, Section 3304
was held unconstitutional in Robinson Township, 52 A.3d at 485, for violating
substantive due process by requiring municipalities to allow oil and gas operations in residential zoning districts.
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14

ment authority. States often use preemption when they want
to create a uniform regulatory environment, which allows in15
dustry to operate more efficiently. However, preemption severely diminishes the ability of local governments to exercise
their traditional powers of zoning and land use regulation to
minimize the effects of industries like fracking on their com16
munities.
In response to state’s attempts to exercise preemption, coalitions of concerned citizen groups and communities have
brought lawsuits in state courts, with minimal success, in the
17
hopes of retaining some control over fracking. Although some
states, such as Colorado, have made nominal attempts to incor18
porate local concerns into their regulations, these efforts are
19
inadequate to protect communities. As a result, local governments across the country are powerless to stop, slow, or even
control the use of fracking.
This Note argues that the current fracking regulatory system is failing to protect the interests of local communities and
that local governments must retain meaningful control over
fracking because they are in the best position to understand
how it affects their communities. Part I discusses how fracking
affects local communities and describes the changing balance of
regulatory power between state and local governments. Part II
analyzes how preemption laws affect local communities’ ability
14. Paul S. Weiland, Preemption of Local Efforts to Protect the Environment: Implications for Local Government Officials, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 467, 468
(1999) [hereinafter Weiland, Preemption Implications] (explaining the definition of preemption).
15. See Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental
Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 242–43 (2000) [hereinafter Weiland, Preemption Analysis] (describing the benefits of uniform environmental laws).
16. See, e.g., Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC v. Salem Twp., 964 A.2d 869
(Pa. 2009) (holding that a township’s oil and gas regulation was preempted by
state law).
17. See, e.g., Robinson Twp., 52 A.3d 463.
18. See Press Release, Office of Gov. John Hickenlooper, Oil and Gas Task
Force Makes Recommendations Related to State and Local Regulatory Jurisdiction (Apr. 18, 2012), available at http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/
GovHickenlooper/CBON/1251621390178.
19. See Bob Berwyn, Colorado: Local Government Officials from Around
the State Blast Gov. Hickenlooper over Longmont Drilling Lawsuit, SUMMIT
CNTY. CITIZENS VOICE (Sept. 19, 2012), http://summitcountyvoice.com/2012/09/
19/colorado-local-government-officials-from-around-the-state-blast-gov
-hickenlooper-over-longmont-drilling-lawsuit/ (showing that the task force has
not prevented further disputes regarding local government control).
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to protect their interests. It evaluates the outcomes of legal battles over fracking regulation, and critiques the few attempts to
increase cooperation in the regulatory process. Part III proposes a solution that would substantially increase local government control over fracking while allowing for the continued development of the industry. It proposes a model for a formal
organization which would bring community representatives
and state decision makers together to create regulations to govern fracking. In the face of state preemption and the rapid expansion of this industry, such a mechanism would help local
governments reclaim control over fracking and allow them to
forcefully advocate for the protection of their local environments and communities.
I. FRACKING AND ITS CHANGING REGULATORY
REGIME
This Part first describes the increased use of fracking and
its impacts on the environment and on communities. This Part
then discusses the changing regulatory regime governing
fracking and introduces local governments’ efforts to regain
control over fracking and state efforts to preempt them.
A. THE IMPACTS OF FRACKING ON LOCAL COMMUNITIES
Hydraulic fracturing is not a new technique; in fact, it was
20
first commercialized in 1949. The recent growth in natural
gas production is due to advances in both horizontal drilling
21
and hydraulic fracturing. These factors have opened up access
to unconventional deposits of shale gas, which were previously
22
uneconomical to produce. Across the country, the number of
natural gas wells has increased from just over 300,000 to over
500,000 in ten years—an increase twice the rate of the previous
23
decade. The United States Energy Information Administration projects an increase of approximately 29% in natural gas
20. Crocker v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 419 P.2d 265, 271 (Okla. 1965).
21. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES: A PRIMER 9 (2009), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/
technologies/oil-gas/publications/EPreports/Shale_Gas_Primer_2009.pdf [hereinafter DOE, MODERN SHALE GAS] (“[S]hale gas production [is also] economically viable [because of] . . . rapid increases in natural gas prices in the last
several years as a result of significant supply and demand pressures.”).
22. Id. at 7.
23. U.S. Natural Gas Number of Gas and Gas Condensate Wells, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., available at http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/na1170_nus_
8a.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
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production between 2010 and 2035, almost entirely due to shale
24
gas. And by 2035, half of the United States’ energy will come
25
from natural gas. Large shale deposits exist across the United
States, but the largest is the Marcellus Shale, which lies under
26
West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New York. Other deposits include the Barnett Shale in Texas, the Fayetteville
Shale in Arkansas, the Woodford Shale in Oklahoma, and the
Haynesville Shale in Arkansas, Texas, and Louisiana, and the
27
Bakken Shale in North Dakota.
As fracking spreads across the country, public concern continues to grow. Early failures of the cement casing in wells
28
caused houses to explode because of methane leaks and con29
taminated rivers and drinking wells. The infamous documentary film Gasland shows homeowners living near natural gas
wells lighting a match and setting their tap water on fire—a
result of increased levels of methane and other toxic chemicals
30
in the water supply. These stories sparked the anti-fracking
movement, leading to waves of protest, celebrity attention, and
31
criticism of the industry.
While these situations draw attention and alarm, the less
dramatic but equally pervasive effect of fracking is the way industrial activity transforms the landscape and character of
32
communities in both rural and urban areas. In many cases,
24. EIA, What Is Shale Gas?, supra note 4.
25. Inman, supra note 1.
26. Shaun A. Goho, Municipalities and Hydraulic Fracturing: Trends in
State Preemption, 64 PLAN. & ENVTL. L., July 2012, at 3.
27. See id.; DOE, MODERN SHALE GAS, supra note 21, at 13.
28. OHIO DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., REPORT ON INVESTIGATION OF THE
NATURAL GAS INVASION OF AQUIFERS IN BAINBRIDGE TOWNSHIP OF GEAUGA
COUNTY, OHIO 46 (2008), available at http://www.dnr.state.oh.us/Portals/11/
bainbridge/report.pdf (noting one such example).
29. See, e.g., Abrahm Lustgarten, Officials in Three States Pin Water Woes
on Gas Drilling, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 26, 2009, 7:00 AM), http://www
.propublica.org/article/officials-in-three-states-pin-water-woes-on-gas-drilling
-426.
30. See ‘Gasland’ Documentary Shows Water that Burns, Toxic Effects of
Natural Gas Drilling, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011, 5:50 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/21/gasland-documentary-shows_n_619840.html.
31. See, e.g., Mark Jaffe, Anti-Fracking Rally Draws Celebrities to Civic
Center Park, DENVER POST, Oct. 24, 2012, http://www.denverpost.com/
commented/ci_21840312?source=commented- (describing a “Frack Free Colorado” rally and concert in Colorado that drew 200 people, including musicians,
actors, and activists).
32. See Spence, supra note 2, at 480–81 (“From the beginning of site preparation through the completion of the fracking job, fracking is an industrial
process, [with all] the air quality, water quality, . . . visual, . . . noise . . . and
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communities are encountering large-scale industrial fossil fuel
production for the first time, and as remote natural gas resources are exhausted, fracking continues to push closer to res33
idential areas. These factors have led to legal battles between
state and local governments over who has the power to control
34
fracking.
Fracking takes place on a concrete well pad, which is a
flattened piece of property requiring a minimum of five acres of
35
land. Operating rigs can run twenty-four hours a day, and the
36
crew often lives on site. Other equipment includes tanks or
pits for liquid storage, piping, and vertical structures, which
37
have a visual impact on the landscape. The fracking process
38
itself can shake the ground, and most of the natural gas processing also occurs on site, requiring “compressor stations, pro39
cessing plants, and transmission lines.” Fracking also includes an enormous increase in truck traffic to haul in
equipment and millions of gallons of the water and chemical
40
mixture used to fracture the shale. This truck traffic contributes to air pollution, road stress, and noise impacts, particular41
ly in small towns unused to industrial activity.
In addition to impacting the nature and character of communities, fracking has significant environmental consequences.
42
Each well may use around five million gallons of water, which
raises concerns about drawdown from groundwater sources,
43
particularly in the Southwest where water is scarce. Commuother [impacts we associate with] industrialization.”).
33. See Goho, supra note 26, at 4.
34. See, e.g., Mireya Navarro, Court Rejects a Ban on Local Fracking Limits, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2012, http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/26/court
-rejects-a-ban-on-local-fracking-limits/ (describing a lawsuit in Pennsylvania
which struck down a state law forbidding municipalities to limit where natural gas drilling can take place).
35. See John M. Smith, The Prodigal Son Returns: Oil and Gas Drillers
Return to Pennsylvania with a Vengeance—Are Municipalities Prepared?, 49
DUQ. L. REV. 1, 6 (2011).
36. See id.
37. Spence, supra note 2, at 444.
38. See id. at 488.
39. Smith, supra note 35, at 7.
40. See id. at 21; Spence, supra note 2, at 444.
41. See Smith, supra note 35, at 21.
42. Id. at 6.
43. See Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 188 (2009) (explaining why states should consider all “cradle to grave” effects of fracking, including effects on groundwa-
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nities are also concerned about what happens with the millions
of gallons of “flowback”—the mixture of water, toxic or carcinogenic chemicals, and sometimes radioactive material, which re44
turns to the surface after the shale is fractured. The industry
often stores this concoction at the well site in open pits or tanks
45
before disposing of it. Sometimes the mixture is discharged directly into surface waters or through a wastewater treatment
facility, but often, it is injected back into an underground for46
mation, which can cause earthquakes. State and local governments are grappling with how to address these and other
environmental effects.
B. AN INTRODUCTION TO LOCAL ZONING POWER AND STATE
PREEMPTION
Because there is no federal regulation of fracking, the battle over regulatory control is occurring at the state and local
47
level. The tension lies between local governments’ zoning
power and the right of states to preempt local control. This Section focuses on the scope of the zoning power and state preemption and the benefits and limitations of local control versus
state control.
1. The Local Zoning Power
Traditionally, local governments could control fracking
48
through the zoning power, which serves to promote orderly
49
use and development of land. States empower municipalities
to enact comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances, through
which the municipality can divide land geographically based on
zones and then designate particular activities or “uses” allowed
50
within each zone. Permitted uses are allowed by right, meanter).
44. See Michelle L. Kennedy, The Exercise of Local Control Over Gas Extraction, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 376–77 (2011). But see Gov. John
Hickenlooper Tells Senate Committee He Drank Fracking Fluid, HUFFINGTON
POST (Feb. 13, 2013, 6:49 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/13/gov
-john-hickenlooper-drank-fracking-fluid-hydraulic-fracturing_n_2674453.html
(describing how the Governor of Colorado claimed he drank the fluid used by
Halliburton in the fracking process to show his support for hydraulic fracturing).
45. See Kennedy, supra note 44, at 377.
46. See Spence, supra note 2, at 487–88.
47. See id. at 447.
48. Smith, supra note 35, at 23–24.
49. Id. at 24.
50. Id.
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ing they can occur without being reviewed by the local govern51
ment. A conditional use, on the other hand, usually involves
an application process and public hearings before it is approved, and these uses can be regulated by the local government to protect “the health, safety, and welfare of the commu52
nity.”
Local governments across the country have used zoning ordinances to ban, restrict, and regulate fracking. Many municipalities have prohibited fracking, either temporarily or perma53
nently. Others exercise the more traditional form of zoning
power by regulating where fracking can occur, such as by requiring that wells be drilled a certain distance away from resi54
dential areas or fragile natural resources. Finally, some municipalities regulate how fracking occurs by imposing permit
requirements and impact fees for road construction and
maintenance, restricting truck traffic, and regulating noise,
55
odors, pollution, visual impacts, and water use and disposal.
2. State Preemption
Municipalities, however, are creations of the state, and ultimately have only as much authority as a state gives them
56
through the state constitution or statutes. States can preempt
local control over an activity through express preemption, con57
flict preemption, or field preemption. Express preemption is
58
an explicit limitation on local control of an activity. Conflict
preemption arises when a court determines an ordinance is superseded because it creates a conflict with a specific part of
59
state law. Field preemption occurs when state regulations are
51. Id.
52. Id. at 24–25.
53. See Local Actions, supra note 8.
54. See, e.g., ARLINGTON, TEX., GAS DRILLING & PROD. ORDINANCES
§ 7.01(B) (2011), available at http://www.arlingtontx.gov/citysecretary/pdf/
codeofordinances/GasDrilling-Chapter.pdf (prohibiting gas drilling within 600
feet of a park or a protected use).
55. See, e.g., id. § 7.01(A); TOWNSHIP. OF JACKSON, PA., ORDINANCE 141
§ 4(C)
(2006),
available
at
http://www.jacksontwppa.com/
masterordinanceindex.htm.
56. Goho, supra note 26, at 5.
57. Id.; cf. Jonathan Rosenbloom, New Day at the Pool: State Preemption,
Common Pool Resources, and Non-Place Based Municipal Collaborations, 36
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 445, 451 (2012) (referring to express, conflict, and implied preemption).
58. Goho, supra note 26, at 5.
59. Id.
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so comprehensive that they occupy the field, leaving no room
60
for local control. These questions of preemption are often further complicated by the municipal home rule, a constitutional
provision granting municipalities the ability to adopt ordinanc61
es regarding issues of local concern. All of the states in which
fracking occurs, except Arkansas, have a municipal home
62
rule. Courts are often the ultimate deciders of the type and
63
scope of state preemption.
Many states have sought to preempt local control over
fracking to create a more consistent regulatory structure and
incentivize natural resource development. The states where
fracking occurs have adopted different approaches to preemp64
65
tion. For example, Pennsylvania and New York have adopted statutes which purport to supersede local regulation of oil
and gas development, but while Pennsylvania has seen an explosion of fracking, New York recently extended its statewide
moratorium on fracking to conduct further study of the process
66
and its effects. Colorado on the other hand, generally follows a
67
conflict preemption approach.
3. The Benefits and Limitations of Preemption
From a policy point of view, there are benefits and limitations to both state control and local control. The primary benefit of state preemption is that uniform regulation creates a
more predictable and stable environment for the private sec60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See infra Part I.C for a discussion of court decisions delineating the
balance of power between state and local governments.
64. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3301–3309 (2013), available at http://www.legis
.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/PDF/58/58.PDF. But see supra note 13 (noting recent finding by a Pennsylvania court that section 3304 is unconstitutional).
65. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0303(2) (Consol. 2013), available at
http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/menuf.cgi.
66. See Under Massive Pressure, New York Extends Fracking Moratorium,
SUSTAINABLEBUSINESS.COM (Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.sustainablebusiness
.com/index.cfm/go/news.display/id/24133 [hereinafter Under Massive Pressure].
67. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, La Plata Cnty. v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs.,
830 P.2d 1045, 1055 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (“The purpose of the preemption
doctrine is to establish a priority between potentially conflicting laws enacted
by various levels of government.”); Goho, supra note 26, at 7 (stating that Colorado courts ask whether an “operational conflict” exists between the municipal ordinance and state regulations, and that the Colorado Supreme Court has
held that municipal bans on oil and gas drilling are preempted per se).
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68

tor. It does this by eliminating the patchwork of regulations
and zoning laws often created when local governments regulate
69
industry themselves.
When creating regulations, states can choose to set uniform minimum standards, uniform maximum standards, or
both. Uniform minimum standards “may raise the bar by estab70
lishing a baseline of protection,” which ensures all municipalities have some regulations in place for an industry. It also can
help prevent a “race to the bottom” which occurs when municipalities relax environmental standards to attract industry and
71
business to their communities. Uniform maximum standards,
on the other hand, which are commonly used in the context of
fracking, set a regulatory ceiling and are created to provide a
72
stable environment for industry to operate.
Preemption is also useful when local governments do not
have the personnel or financial ability to regulate the impacts
of an industry. States generally have more resources with
73
which they can create and enforce regulations. Finally, not all
local governments want to impose regulations on industrial activity in their communities, especially when they reap the benefits of the industry and the negative impacts are spread over a
74
wider area. In these cases, states are better positioned to cre75
ate regulations to ensure that costs and benefits are shared.
On the other hand, local governments are better positioned
76
to tailor laws to address particularized harms. Uniform environmental laws and regulations are often inflexible and cannot
77
address the context-specific impacts of activities like fracking.
When the impact of an industry is localized, decision-making

68. See Weiland, Preemption Analysis, supra note 15, at 242–43.
69. See id. at 276.
70. See id. at 242.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Weiland, Preemption Implications, supra note 14, at 504 (describing how “federal laws displaced weak and under-enforced state and local laws”
in the 1960s and 1970s).
74. See id. at 504–05 (postulating that centralized environmental protection may result in the coordination necessary to overcome negative externalities).
75. See id.
76. See Annie Decker, Preemption Conflation: Dividing the Local from the
State in Congressional Decision Making, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 321, 355
(2012).
77. See Weiland, Preemption Implications, supra note 14, at 505.
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that is decentralized and participatory is often preferable to
78
centralized decision making.
Additionally, the process of local governance is often
79
viewed as democracy at work. Local governments are closer to
the people and frequently more responsive to citizen concerns
80
than state governments. In the face of preemption, local gov81
ernments have fewer avenues to respond to citizen’s concerns.
Preemption can also force local governments to become
“lobbyists, as opposed to lawmakers” because their only option
82
is to advocate for change in the state regulations. Often, local
governments do not have this type of political power and cannot
83
spare limited resources for lobbying.
On a broader level, preemption limits the ability of local
governments to create innovative responses to environmental
84
concerns. Communities often lead the country on environmental issues when they are able to experiment with approaches to
85
land use and the protection of natural resources. Even more
broadly, local governments have carefully guarded their right
to determine what kind of communities they will live in and
86
how their land is used. Preemption inhibits the ability of local
communities to create and fulfill their own unique visions of
87
how they will live.
C. RESOLVING DISPUTES BETWEEN STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS
Disputes about the balance of power between state and local governments over fracking are taking place across the country. Frequently, challenges to local ordinances come from natural gas companies, which generally prefer uniform state

78. See id. at 505–06.
79. See id. at 499.
80. See id.
81. See Weiland, Preemption Analysis, supra note 15, at 281.
82. See Weiland, Preemption Implications, supra note 14, at 500.
83. See id. at 498.
84. See Weiland, Preemption Analysis, supra note 15, at 280.
85. See Jerrold A. Long, Sustainability Starts Locally: Untying the Hands
of Local Government to Create Sustainable Communities, 10 WYO. L. REV. 1,
33 (2010).
86. Id. at 21.
87. See id. at 33–34 (“A western democracy of communities . . . is the necessary precondition to the full application of our individual and collective intelligence and creativity to the task of creating a sustainable West.”).
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regulation over fragmented local regulation. Litigation concerning the scope of local authority has been particularly preva89
lent in Pennsylvania, New York, and Colorado. These ongoing
disputes have had mixed results for the industry and local governments, with some courts upholding ordinances regulating
where fracking occurs, but striking down ordinances regulating
90
how fracking occurs. Some courts, particularly in states such
as Colorado where conflict preemption prevails, will analyze
each aspect of local regulations to determine whether they con91
flict with state law. In other states, local governments have no
92
authority to regulate gas drilling. Finally, total bans on
93
fracking by municipalities have been upheld in some states
94
but prohibited in others.
In addition to pursuing litigation, some state and local governments have tried to cooperate in the regulation of fracking.
The governor of Colorado created a task force to identify areas
of local concern and to involve local governments more fully in
95
the regulatory process. In the northeast, the Delaware River
Basin Commission, a multi-state organization with statutory
power to protect water resources, has sought to expand its role
96
to regulate fracking. These attempts have received mixed re88. See Goho, supra note 26, at 5.
89. Id. at 5–8.
90. See Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d 458,
465 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (upholding a ban on fracking under the local zoning power), aff’d sub nom. Norse Energy Corp. USA v. Town of Dryden, 964 N.Y.S.2d
714 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013), leave to appeal granted, No. 2013-604, 2013 WL
4562930 (N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013); Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 943 N.Y.S.2d 722, 723 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (same); Huntley & Huntley,
Inc. v. Borough Council of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855, 863 (Pa. 2009) (upholding
restriction on where fracking occurs); Range Res.-Appalachia LLC v. Salem
Twp., 964 A.2d 869, 876 (Pa. 2009) (striking down local ordinance that attempted to regulate how fracking occurs).
91. See Town of Frederick v. N. Am. Res. Co., 60 P.3d 758, 765 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2002) (holding that state law did not preempt the entirety of a municipal
oil and gas drilling ordinance, but that the ordinance’s setback, noise abatement, and visual impact provisions were preempted).
92. See N.E. Natural Energy, LLC v. Morgantown, W.V., No. 11-C-411,
slip op. at 10 (Monongalia Cnty. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011) (holding that the W.
VA. CODE § 22-1-1 et seq. (1994) gives exclusive control of the area of oil and
gas development to the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection).
93. See Anschutz Exploration Corp., 940 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
94. See Voss v. Lundvall Bros., 830 P.2d 1061, 1068 (Colo. 1992).
95. See Press Release, Hickenlooper, supra note 18.
96. See Natural Gas Drilling Index Page, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N,
http://www.nj.gov/drbc/programs/natural/ (last modified July 18, 2013).
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views. In Colorado, local governments are concerned that the
value of the task force is minimal and has neither increased local government power over fracking nor prevented conflict be97
tween state and local governments. Questions have risen regarding the Delaware River Basin Commission’s actual
effectiveness and its appropriate scope of authority over
98
fracking. On the whole, whether conflict or cooperation has
prevailed, the result is that local governments are experiencing
diminished control over fracking in their communities.
II. THE CURRENT REGULATORY REGIME IS FAILING TO
PROTECT LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER
FRACKING
This Part analyzes how Pennsylvania, New York, Colorado,
and the Delaware River Basin Commission approach fracking
regulations and their effect on local governments’ control over
fracking. Part A evaluates the outcome of legal disputes over
fracking in Pennsylvania and New York. Part B explores the
effectiveness of Colorado’s efforts to cooperate with local governments to create fracking regulations and the Delaware River Basin Commission’s attempt to exert regional control over
the regulation of fracking.
A. CONFLICTS OVER THE REGULATION OF FRACKING
Fracking is causing intense conflict between local governments, the state, and the oil and gas industry over where regulatory power should reside. Pennsylvania and New York are
two states where litigation over preemption and regulatory control is prevalent. These states have taken similar approaches to
preemption and both result in diminished local control over
fracking.
1. Express Preemption in Pennsylvania
The Marcellus Shale, lying beneath New York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Ohio, is one of the nation’s largest shale
99
formations. Of these states, Pennsylvania has seen the largest
97. See, e.g., Berwyn, supra note 19 (showing that Colorado task force has
not prevented further disputes regarding local government control).
98. See Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 26), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2147860 [hereinafter Osofsky & Wiseman, Hybrid
Energy].
99. Elisabeth N. Radow, Citizen David Tames Gas Goliaths on the Marcel-
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100

expansion of fracking, and consequently, the greatest number
of disputes regarding who has the power to control it.
Pennsylvania takes an express preemption approach to
101
drilling. Even before its most recent overhaul, the Oil and
Gas Act of Pennsylvania was written to preempt almost all lo102
cal control over oil and gas drilling. Local governments challenged the law, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a
pair of decisions determining the limits of state preemption and
103
the boundaries of the local zoning power. In the first case, the
court decided that the location of a natural gas well was not a
104
feature of the operation regulated by the Act, meaning that
local governments retained the power to impose siting requirements on wells. The court also decided that the local regulation did not “accomplish the same purposes” as the Act, because although some of the goals of the state and local
regulations were the same, the court found that the primary
goal of the local regulations was to “preserv[e] the character of
105
residential neighborhoods.”
In the second case, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court struck down an ordinance that attempted to regulate
surface and land development associated with oil and gas drill106
ing. The court found that the ordinance attempted to create a
lus Shale Stage: Citizen Action as a Form of Dispute Prevention in the Internet
Age, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 373, 374 (2011).
100. U.S. Crude Oil and Natural Gas Proved Reserves, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/crudeoilreserves/ (last updated Aug. 1,
2013).
101. See Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council of Oakmont, 964 A.2d
855, 863 (Pa. 2009) (“As applied presently, Section 602 of the Oil and Gas Act
contains express preemption language. That language totally preempts local
regulation of oil and gas development except with regard to municipal ordinances adopted pursuant to the MPC as well as the Flood Plain Management
Act.”).
102. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3302 (2013), available at http://www.legis.state
.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/PDF/58/58.PDF (formerly 58 PA. STAT. ANN. § 601.602
(1996)).
103. See Goho, supra note 26, at 6.
104. Huntley & Huntley, 964 A.2d at 863–64 (“[A]lthough . . . the Act places
some restrictions on the siting of wells-most notably, setback requirements
designed to prevent damage to existing water wells, buildings and bodies of
water, as well as measures intended to protect attributes of Pennsylvania’s
landscape such as parks, forests, gamelands, scenic rivers, natural landmarks,
and historical and archeological sites, it does not automatically follow that the
placement of a natural gas well at a certain location is a feature of its operation.”) (citations omitted).
105. Id. at 865.
106. Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC v. Salem Twp., 694 A.2d 869, 877 (Pa.
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“comprehensive regulatory scheme” and was therefore
107
preempted by the Oil and Gas Act. The court specifically
found that many of the regulations in the ordinance “substantively overlap[ped]” with state regulations because both established permitting procedures, imposed bonding requirements,
and regulated site restoration after drilling operations
108
ceased.
These two cases delineated the balance of regulatory power
in Pennsylvania and left local governments with little control
over fracking. In these decisions, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court adopted a “how versus where” distinction to determine
109
which level of government has regulatory power. In other
words, local governments retain limited control over the location of gas wells within their communities, but are preempted
from regulating any aspect of the wells’ operation, even if the
110
operations affect the community’s health, safety and welfare.
However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also acknowledged the importance of the local zoning power and the unique
interests local governments have in the development of their
land. In Huntley, for example, the court noted that local zoning
regulations are important because they “deal with all potential
land uses and generally incorporate an overall statement of
111
community development objectives . . . .”
The court stated
that the intent of the local ordinance was to establish “objectives relating to the safety and welfare of its citizens, encouraging the most appropriate use of land . . . conserving the value of
property, minimizing overcrowding and traffic congestion, and
112
providing adequate open spaces.” Zoning laws are designed to
recognize the “unique expertise” of municipal governing bodies
to determine how land is used and developed to protect the
113
character of the community. Yet, despite these important ob2009) (“In view of the Ordinance’s focus solely on regulating oil and gas drilling operations, together with the broad preemptive scope of [the Oil and Gas]
Act with regard to such directed local regulations, . . . each of the oil and gas
regulations challenged in Appellees’ complaint is preempted by the Oil and
Gas Act and its associated administrative regulations.”).
107. Id. at 875.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 873; see Goho, supra note 26, at 4–5.
110. See Goho, supra note 26, at 5–6.
111. Huntley & Huntley Inc. v. Borough Council of Oakmont, 964 A.2d 855,
865 (Pa. 2009).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 866.
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jectives, the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act and these court decisions do not fully allow a local government to make decisions
regarding land use, because they are preempted from imposing
different or more stringent regulations on oil and gas development and fracking. Preemption directly undermines the purpose and importance of local zoning.
The power of local governments was further diminished
when the Pennsylvania legislature overhauled the Oil and Gas
Act and replaced it with Act 13, which sought to preempt all local regulation of oil and gas operations, including environmen114
tal laws and all zoning code provisions. Section 3304 of the
Act required that every local ordinance allow for the “reasonable development of oil and gas resources” and that oil and gas
115
operations be “a permitted use in all zoning districts.” Permitted uses are allowed as a matter of right, so Act 13 gave local governments no say as to how or where fracking took
116
place.
The subsequent legal battle brought together a large coalition of plaintiffs, including municipalities, land owners, envi117
ronmentalists and citizen groups. The plaintiffs challenged
the constitutionality of Act 13, and specifically § 3304, arguing
in part that it forced municipalities to enact zoning ordinances
allowing mining and gas operations in all zoning districts regardless of the municipalities’ comprehensive plan and devel118
opment structure. The court, consistent with the “how versus
119
where” distinction, found that “§ 3304 violat[ed] substantive
due process because it allows incompatible uses in zoning districts and does not protect the interests of neighboring property
owners from harm, alters the character of the neighborhood,
114. See Nancy D. Perkins, The Fracturing of Place: The Regulation of
Marcellus Shale Development and the Subordination of Local Experience, 23
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 44, 45–47 (2012).
115. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3304(a), (b)(5) (2013), available at http://www
.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/PDF/58/58.PDF (emphasis added).
116. See supra Part I.B.1.
117. See, e.g., Janice Crompton, Municipal Officials Decry State Control of
Shale Drilling, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 14, 2011, http://old.post
-gazette.com/pg/11348/1196672-455-0.stm?cmpid=news.xml (quoting state
Representative Jess White as saying, “[e]liminating or severely limiting local
zoning of Marcellus Shale is indefensible corporate welfare on the backs of the
taxpayers of Pennsylvania”).
118. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463, 480–81 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2012).
119. Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC v. Salem Twp., 964 A.2d 869, 873 (Pa.
2009) (describing the “how versus where” distinction).
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120

and makes irrational classifications.” The court permanently
enjoined the Commonwealth from enforcing the provisions of
121
§ 3304.
The State appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of
122
Pennsylvania, which has yet to rule. Given the precedent, it
seems likely that the state supreme court will at least uphold
the ruling regarding § 3304 of Act 13. While Pennsylvania
courts have protected some local control over fracking and oil
and gas development, the Pennsylvania legislature has shown
an interest in the unfettered development of natural gas in the
state. Under the doctrine of state preemption, the courts are
unable to fully prevent these actions, despite recognizing the
importance of the local zoning power. The strong reaction of local governments to these attempts to preempt their control indicates that these communities do not believe their interests
are being protected by the state or the courts.
The negative reactions of communities are substantiated
by analysis which suggests that although the Oil and Gas Act
contains environmental regulations, they do not allow for
123
meaningful input from citizens. For instance, § 3212.1 of the
Oil and Gas Act allows municipalities to submit comments to
the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection
124
(DEP) when gas wells are proposed within their boundaries.
However, the DEP’s review of the comments is restricted to
matters related only to the location of the well, and the DEP is
125
not required to actually consider the comments. In addition,
there is no mechanism through which municipalities can ap126
peal DEP decisions.
120. Robinson Twp., 52 A.3d at 485.
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Paul J. Gough, Corbett Appeals Ruling on Act 13 Zoning,
PITTSBURGH BUS. TIMES, Jul. 27, 2012, http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/
blog/energy/2012/07/corbett-appeals-ruling-on-act-13-zoning.html.
123. See generally 14 Reasons to Oppose HB 1950 and SB 1100,
MARCELLUS OUTREACH BUTLER, http://www.marcellusoutreachbutler.org/14
-reasons-to-oppose-hb-1950-and-sb1100.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
124. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3212.1(a) (2013), available at http://www.legis
.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/PDF/58/58.PDF.
125. Id. § 3212.1(b) (“Comments and responses under subsections (a) and
(a.1) may be considered by the department in accordance with section 3215(d)
(relating to well location restrictions).”).
126. Id. § 3215(d) (“Notwithstanding any other law, no municipality or
storage operator shall have a right of appeal or other form of review from the
department’s decision.”); see also Perkins, supra note 114, at 52–53 (“The
comment process is limited, however, because DEP’s review is restricted to
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The regulations themselves are not stringent enough to
protect communities and the environment. PennFuture, an environmental group in Pennsylvania called the legislation a
127
“weak” and “squandered” opportunity. The House Minority
Leader Frank Dermody opined that the legislation “does not
raise the revenues necessary to make sure the taxpayers are
128
not left holding the bag” with regard to clean-up. In addition,
a part of the act which went into effect in September 2012 gives
authority to DEP administrators, instead of local experts, to
decide whether and when residential water users should receive letters regarding water quality issues in their neighborhoods, meaning that the public may not receive any notification
129
if there are contaminants in their water supply. Environmental groups such as the Sierra Club, Earthjustice, Clean Water
Action, and the Delaware Riverkeeper Network asked the governor to reverse the change so that the public receives infor130
mation about its water quality immediately.
Ultimately, the citizens of Pennsylvania have seen a rapid
expansion of an industry that has a significant impact on land
use and is not being appropriately regulated by the state government. While local governments have, thanks to the courts
retained minimal power over where fracking can take place in
their communities, they cannot control the process of fracking
to reduce its impacts on the community and the environment.
2. A Cautionary Tale: Preemption and the Fracking
Moratorium in New York
Unlike Pennsylvania, New York has not experienced a
boom in natural gas production because the state has a morato131
rium on fracking. New York has taken a very cautious approach to fracking to ensure it is carried out in a way that is
consistent with protecting the environment and communities.

matters related to well location, the consideration of comments is not mandatory and municipalities cannot appeal DEP permit decisions.”).
127. Laura Olson, Shale Bill Heads to Governor, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, Feb. 9, 2012, http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/local/state/shale
-bill-heads-to-governor-215214/.
128. Id.
129. Kevin Begos, 14 Eco Groups Ask Pennsylvania to Change Drill/Water
Policy, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 23, 2012, http://www.poconorecord.com/apps/
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20121023/NEWS90/121029908/-1/news.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Under Massive Pressure, supra note 66.
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In many ways, however, New York’s approach to preemption and local control mirrors Pennsylvania in that New York
has taken an express preemption approach to regulation. New
York’s Oil, Gas, and Solution Mining law states: “The provisions of this article shall supersede all local laws or ordinances
relating to the regulation of the oil, gas and solution mining in132
dustries.” The court battles in New York are also similar to
those in Pennsylvania. Following Huntley and Range-Resources
133
in Pennsylvania, New York courts considered similar cases
regarding the scope of state preemption. In Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town of Dryden, the court considered a zoning ordinance that banned all activities related to exploration, pro134
duction and storage of natural gas and oil.
Anschutz
Exploration Corporation sued the town, arguing that New York
135
state law preempted the ordinance. The court held that because the “statute[] preempt[s] only local regulations ‘relating’
to the applicable industry . . . [it does] not expressly preempt
local regulation of land use, but only regulations dealing with
136
operations.” Similarly, in a case decided just days later, a
court in a different county upheld a complete local ban on
fracking: “[n]either the plain reading of the statutory language
nor the [statute’s history] would lead this court to conclude that
the phrase ‘this article shall supersede all local laws or ordinances relating to the regulation of the oil, gas and solution
mining industries’ . . . was intended by the Legislature to abrogate the constitutional and statutory authority vested in local
137
municipalities to enact legislation affecting land use.”
These cases show that, similar to Pennsylvania, New York
adheres to a “how versus where” distinction regarding the
138
scope of local zoning power. However, New York goes further
than Pennsylvania by recognizing that a complete ban on
132. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0303(2) (Consol. 2013), available at
http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/menuf.cgi.
133. See supra Part II.A.1.
134. Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. Town of Dryden, 940 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Norse Energy Corp. USA v. Town of Dryden, 964 N.Y.S.2d 714 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013), leave to appeal granted, No.
2013-604, 2013 WL 4562930 (N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013).
135. Id. at 461.
136. Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
137. Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of Middlefield, 943 N.Y.S.2d 722,
728 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012), aff’d, 964 N.Y.S.2d 431 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013).
138. Id. at 729 (“The state maintains control over the ‘how’ of such procedures while the municipalities maintain control over the ‘where’ of such exploration.”).
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fracking is considered a regulation of the “where” of fracking.
New York, therefore, has afforded greater protection to municipalities that want to completely exclude fracking from their
communities. But, the law leaves no avenue for local governments that want to allow fracking to impose regulations on operations tailored to the concerns of the community.
The court in Anschutz also left open the possibility that future regulations could further prevent local control: “In the absence of a clear expression of legislative intent to preempt local
control over land use, the statute could not be read as preempt139
ing local zoning authority.” In addition, although this case
was upheld on appeal, its fate now rests in the hands of the
highest court in New York, which granted leave to appeal in
140
Finally, because there is currently a
August of 2013.
statewide moratorium on fracking, the ultimate validity of local
ordinances regulating or banning fracking as well as the
strength of final statewide environmental protections are still
in flux.
On the political front in New York, citizen groups have
been effective in pressuring the government to more closely
study the effects of fracking. In September of 2012, Governor
Cuomo’s administration announced that New York must review
141
potential health effects of fracking. The administration made
this decision even though the state had been studying fracking
for the previous four years, which culminated in an extensive
Environmental Impact Statement documenting the impacts of
142
fracking. However, the 80,000 public comments sent to the
commissioner of the State Department of Environmental Conservation raised numerous concerns about public health and
143
called for either a permanent ban or further study. Many
comments called for an independent study of the health and
environmental effects, and although the state has rejected that
idea, it appears open to the possibility of receiving input from
139. Anschutz, 940 N.Y.S.2d at 466–67.
140. Norse Energy Corp. USA v. Town of Dryden, No. 2013-604, 2013 WL
4562930, at *1 (N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013).
141. See, e.g., Mireya Navarro, New York State Plans Health Review as It
Weighs Gas Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/09/21/nyregion/new-york-states-decision-on-hydrofracking-will-await
-health-review.html?_r=0.
142. See N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, REVISED DRAFT SGEIS ON
THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM (2011), available
at http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/75370.html.
143. See Navarro, supra note 141.
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144

outside experts. While this shows the importance and potential effectiveness of citizen action, the ultimate outcome of
fracking regulations and preemption of local zoning laws remains unclear. Under the current law, municipalities can impose local bans on fracking but the state statute preempts the
145
regulation of fracking operations by local governments.
B. ATTEMPTS AT COOPERATION IN THE REGULATION OF
FRACKING
While Pennsylvania and New York follow an express
preemption approach to fracking, some attempts at cooperation
have occurred elsewhere. This Section will describe the different attempts at cooperation made by Colorado and by the Delaware River Basin Commission.
1. The Tension Between Conflict and Cooperation in Colorado
Colorado presents a particularly interesting example of the
battle for control over fracking and oil and gas development. In
Colorado, the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (Colorado
Commission) has express authority over oil and gas develop146
ment. Colorado courts look to whether there is an “operation147
al conflict” between zoning ordinances and state regulations.
This involves a detailed factual investigation into whether local
regulations “conflict with the achievement of the state inter148
est.”
The battle over control of oil and gas development has a
decades-old history in Colorado, beginning in the 1980s when
149
drilling moved closer to populated areas. For example, in
Town of Frederick v. North American Resources Co., the court
used a conflict preemption approach and determined that local
governments could not impose stricter technical or safety condi150
tions on wells than state regulations. At the same time, how144. See id.
145. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0303(2) (Consol. 2013), available at
http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/menuf.cgi.
146. See Angela Neese, Comment, The Battle Between the Colorado Oil and
Gas Conservation Commission and Local Governments: A Call for a New and
Comprehensive Approach, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 561, 565 (2005).
147. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, La Plata Cnty. v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., 830
P.2d 1045, 1059 (Colo. 1992).
148. Town of Frederick v. N. Am. Res. Co., 60 P.3d 758, 761 (Colo. 2002)
(quoting Bowen/Edwards, 830 P.2d at 1059).
149. See Neese, supra note 146, at 566.
150. Town of Frederick, 60 P.3d at 765.
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ever, the court upheld the town’s ability to issue its own permits for oil and gas drilling if the conditions did not conflict
151
with state regulations.
152
However, unlike New York, the Colorado Supreme Court
has established a per se rule that municipal bans on oil and gas
development are impermissible. In Voss v. Lundvall Brothers,
the court considered four factors to determine whether a state
regulatory scheme preempted local regulation: “[1] whether
there is a need for statewide uniformity of regulation; [2]
whether the municipal regulation has an extraterritorial impact; [3] whether the subject matter is one traditionally governed by state or local government; and [4] whether the Colorado Constitution specifically commits the particular matter to
153
state or local regulation.” In this case, the court found that
the need for statewide uniformity of regulation of oil and gas
development and production weighed in favor of eliminating
154
the right of communities to ban fracking and drilling. The
court determined that local bans would conflict with the state’s
interest in the “efficient and fair development and production of
155
oil and gas resources.”
Colorado has therefore taken a conflict approach to determining when local regulation of oil and gas development is and
is not permitted. Colorado courts have also come to the now
familiar result that local governments are preempted from regulating problematic aspects of fracking operations and they are
not able to impose complete bans on fracking. Where Colorado
differs from other state, however, is the state government tried
to take a more cooperative approach to regulation.
In February of 2012, Governor Hickenlooper of Colorado
created the Oil and Gas Task Force to resolve fracking-related
issues through a cooperative approach, with the goal of avoid156
ing litigation and new legislation. Some important aspects of
the task force include: encouraging local governments to name
a Local Government Designee to participate in the Colorado Oil
and Gas Conservation Commission program; informing Designees of the opportunity to request an additional ten days to re151. Id. at 763.
152. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing how New York courts have upheld
complete local bans on fracking).
153. Voss v. Lundvall Bros., 830 P.2d 1061, 1067 (Colo. 1992).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Press Release, Hickenlooper, supra note 18.
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view permits; providing for mutual understanding by promulgating accurate information and identifying development impacts; promoting technical training of Designees; and providing
157
general education to communities.
The recommendations that ultimately emerged from the
task force, however, neither mention any possibilities for new
regulation nor do they actually give local governments much
158
say in the process of permitting and regulating wells. The Local Government Designee program through the Colorado Commission only gives the Designee the opportunity to engage in
consultation with the operator of an oil and gas well, requires
that they be given notice of an impending permit, and allows
159
them to file complaints. There do not appear to be any opportunities for the Designee to actually influence the regulation of
160
fracking operations in their community.
Furthermore, the structure of the Colorado Commission
calls into question its ability and commitment to meaningfully
engage local government in the regulation of oil and gas development. Historically, the board of the Colorado Commission
161
was composed entirely of industry representatives. Under the
1994 amendments, the board composition changed slightly, requiring two out of the seven seats on the board to be held by
non-industry members who are experienced in agriculture, land
162
reclamation, environmental protection, or soil conservation.
Further amendments in 2007 added additional requirements
for board members, to ensure that at least one representative
163
had experience in every one of these areas. However, the
amendments also required that three members have substantial experience in the oil and gas industry and three members
have a college degree in petroleum geology or petroleum engi-

157. See id.
158. See id. (listing the Task Force’s recommendations).
159. See Surface Owner/LGD Involvement in COGCC Processes, COLO. OIL
& GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, http://www.cogcc.state.co.us/ (select “General”
tab; then follow “Surface Owner/LGD Flowchart” hyperlink) (last visited Oct.
18, 2013).
160. See generally id. (presenting a rudimentary flow chart as the only information available regarding the Local Government Designee Program on the
Colorado Commission’s website).
161. See Neese, supra note 146, at 575–76.
162. See id. at 576 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-104(2)(a) (2013), available at http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/statutes.html.
163. COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-104 (2013), available at http://www.sos.state
.co.us/pubs/elections/statutes.html.
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164

neering. In addition, the 2007 amendments actually removed
the requirement that two of the seats be held by non-industry
members, and did not replace this provision with a new quota
or requirement. It is entirely conceivable that the individuals
with backgrounds in environmental issues could still have significant ties to the industry, and even more likely that those
with degrees or experience related to oil and gas are in some
way beholden to the industry. This composition raises “fox
guarding the hen house” concerns because the Colorado Commission has the “power to make and enforce rules, regulations,
and orders” and to “do whatever may reasonably be necessary
165
to carry out the provisions of the Act.”
Finally, the Task Force has thus far been unsuccessful in
promoting cooperation, stemming conflict, or alleviating local
concerns about fracking. For example, in July of 2012, the Colorado Commission and the Colorado State Attorney General’s
Office sued the City of Longmont, claiming that the oil and gas
regulations passed by the city “trespassed into areas meant to
166
be governed by the state.”
Later that year, Longmont city residents voted to amend
their city charter to ban fracking and the storage of fracking
167
168
waste in their city. Given the legal precedent in Colorado, it
169
seems inevitable that this ban will be struck down. Even
though the charter still allows other types of extraction, the
fact that an estimated eighty to ninety percent of modern wells
170
use fracking means it will be relatively straightforward for a
court to find that the ban on the use of fracking limits the efficient development of resources.

164. Id.
165. Id. § 34-60-105(1).
166. See Scott Rochat, State Sues Longmont Over Oil and Gas Drilling
Regulations, LONGMONT TIMES-CALL, July 30, 2012, http://www.timescall.com/
news/longmont-local-news/ci_21193961/colorado-files-lawsuit-against
-longmont-oil-gas-drilling.
167. See Voters Approve Longmont Fracking Ban, THE DENVER POST, Nov.
7, 2012, http://www.denverpost.com/dontmiss/ci_21948965/voters-approve
-longmont-fracking-ban.
168. See supra notes 153–55 and accompanying text.
169. See Scott Rochat, With Longmont Fracking Ban Passed, Questions Lie
Ahead, LONGMONT TIMES-CALL, Nov. 8, 2012, http://www.timescall.com/news/
ci_21960617/longmont-fracking-ban-passed-questions-lie-ahead
(discussing
attorney Rick Samson’s opinion that the ban likely will not stand a legal challenge in the courtroom).
170. See id.
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Even if the Longmont ban ends up being merely symbolic,
it emphasizes continued public resistance to fracking, and illustrates the remaining concerns about its effect on communities
and the environment. Ultimately, the cooperative efforts in
Colorado have not served their stated purpose of promoting cooperation and stemming conflict between state and local governments, and it is clear that local governments in Colorado
remain inadequately involved in the regulation of fracking in
their communities.
2. A Regional Approach: Evaluating the Delaware River Basin
Commission’s Efforts to Take Control over Fracking
The Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC) is a federal-interstate government agency formed through a compact in
1961 between the United States and Pennsylvania, New York,
171
New Jersey, and Delaware. The DRBC’s members include the
governors of the member states and the North Atlantic Division
Engineer of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, who serves as
172
the federal representative. The DRBC has legal authority
over water-quality related issues in the Delaware River Ba173
sin. In 2010, it drafted regulations for natural gas develop174
ment. The concerns of the DRBC include how the amount of
water used in fracking affects water resources, the release of
pollutants into ground water from drilling operations, and the
treatment and disposal of flowback, which contains chemicals
and occasionally radioactive material, from fracking opera175
tions.
The regulations would constrain the number and location
of gas sites within the watershed, require surface and groundwater monitoring, require sites to comply with setback requirements, limit the quantity of water that may be withdrawn
for fracking, impose mandatory waste disposal processes, and
176
require water quality testing. However, the DRBC defers to
171. See Natural Gas Drilling Index Page, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N,
http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/programs/natural/ (last modified July 18, 2013)
(describing the DRBC’s history and involvement in natural gas drilling in the
Northeast).
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
176. See DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N, DRBC DRAFT NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS “AT-A-GLANCE” FACT SHEET (2010), available at http://
www.state.nj.us/drbc/library/documents/naturalgas-draftregs-factsheet.pdf.
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the state for well construction and operation procedures.
These regulations were proposed in 2010, and revised in 2011,
178
but have yet to be approved by the state members.
While the DRBC is an important example of interstate cooperation regarding environmental protection, in the context of
fracking its limitations will likely come to define it more than
its successes. First, there are serious questions regarding the
legitimate scope of the DRBC’s jurisdiction over fracking. The
DRBC was developed in 1961, long before fracking was an issue
in the region, and arguably, its mandate does not extend to the
179
regulation of fracking.
Second, the regulations have yet to be approved by the
member states and it is unclear whether they ever will be.
Pennsylvania believes that the DRBC should limit its regulations to issues of water withdrawal and wastewater management, and leave all other regulations to the state, such as
wastewater discharge permits, residual waste management,
well construction and operation activities, and erosion and sed180
iment control. Similarly, New York has asked the DRBC to
halt all efforts to complete and publish draft regulations, believing they are duplicative of state regulations and unneces181
sary.
Third, the DRBC’s purview over water use and contamination does not cover the full range of problems posed by fracking.
Issues such as air pollution, as well as the more direct and
physical impacts of fracking, like the visual impacts, sound pollution, traffic, and setbacks cannot be regulated by the
182
DRBC. Indeed, the DRBC has left many of these issues up to
177. See id.
178. See Draft Natural Gas Development Regulations, DEL. RIVER BASIN
COMM’N, http://www.nj.gov/drbc/programs/natural/draft-regulations.html (last
modified Nov. 7, 2012).
179. See Osofsky & Wiseman, Hybrid Energy, supra note 98, at 26 (stating
many “have questioned the authority of the [DRBC] to interpret its jurisdictional mandate so broadly”).
180. See Letter from Michael L. Krancer, Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., to
Carol Collier, Exec. Dir., Del. River Basin Comm’n (Apr. 11, 2011), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/library/documents/NGC/Agencies/PADEP041111
.pdf (noting that additional DRBC oversight would be “duplicative and unnecessary”).
181. See Letter from James M. Tierney, Assistant Comm’r for Water Res.,
N.Y. State Dep’t. of Envtl. Conservation, to Carol Collier, Exec. Dir., Del. River Basin Comm’n (Apr. 15, 2011), available at http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/
library/documents/NGC/Agencies/NYSDEC041511.pdf.
182. See Congressman Matt Cartwright Joins Advocacy Groups to Discuss
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state regulation, which leaves local governments with the same
preemption problems they faced before.
Ultimately, while the DRBC is a useful model for a cooperative approach to regulating fracking, as it stands it has inadequate support and authority to go forward with the regulatory
process and does not address many of the concerns most relevant to local governments.
III. MOVING PAST PREEMPTION
Despite some efforts to enhance cooperation between state
and local governments, the analysis above shows that the trend
in states has been to preempt local government control over
fracking. A solution to the regulation of fracking must include
increasing the involvement and control of local governments,
because they are best suited to understand the impacts of
fracking on the character and environment of their communities.
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER
FRACKING
In the context of fracking, the interests of state and local
governments diverge. Although the state statutes described
above contain statements related to protecting the health and
welfare of communities and the environment, the primary purpose of these statutes is to promote the development of natural
resources, and they are written to facilitate the growth of the
183
industry. Government officials who operate at a state-wide
level are less likely than local officials to notice or be concerned
184
with how fracking affects particular communities, and local
officials often do not have the resources to advocate for their in185
terests. Fracking has an intense impact on the character of
the land, and its effects are felt most by the communities in
Potential Impacts of Fracking Near National Parks and Trails, APPALACHIAN
MOUNTAIN CLUB (July 15, 2013), http://www.outdoors.org/about/newsroom/
press/2013/fracking-national-parks.cfm.
183. See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, La Plata Cnty. v. Bowen/Edwards
Assocs., 830 P.2d 1045, 1057 (Colo. 1992) (“The state’s interest in oil and gas
development is centered primarily on the efficient production and utilization
of the natural resources in the state.”).
184. See Long, supra note 85, at 20 (highlighting that western communities
are “incredibly diverse”).
185. See Weiland, Preemption Implications, supra note 14, at 498 (describing the Town of Wendell’s small population and lack of resources as an impediment to successfully lobbying state officials).
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186

which it takes place. Preemption eliminates the ability of
these communities to make land-use decisions tailored to localized concerns and to deal specifically with the impacts of
fracking on the environment, roads, other local infrastructure,
187
and quality of life. Because states such as Colorado have taken a ceiling approach to preemption, local communities are unable to create stricter regulations that might be necessary to
188
address particular localized impacts of the industry. The continuing legal and political battles over fracking indicate that local governments and communities are dissatisfied with the how
state governments have taken away their powers over the development and use of land. Local governments must have
greater power to regulate fracking.
B. A NEW MODEL FOR CREATING AND IMPLEMENTING FRACKING
REGULATIONS
The solution proposed by this Note attempts to balance the
interests of local governments with continued development of
the natural gas industry in a way that has not yet been attempted or specifically proposed in the context of the regulation
of fracking. Some authors propose increased federal regulation
189
over fracking. Although a federal regime may improve certain
aspects of the fracking process, such as disclosure of chemicals
and waste disposal, federal law would not address the unique
local concerns of communities related to siting, and other localized community and environmental impacts. Furthermore,
natural gas drilling enjoys open support from both sides of the
political aisle, and Congress and the President appear uninter190
ested in imposing federal regulations on fracking. Other authors suggest simply preserving traditional local control over
191
the siting of fracking operations. Siting power alone, howev186. See Spence, supra note 2, at 444 (“These operations fundamentally
change the character of an area for the duration of fracking activities.”).
187. See Perkins, supra note 114, at 51.
188. See supra Part II.B.1.
189. See generally Wiseman, supra note 43 (discussing the need for federal
regulation of fracking). But see Spence, supra note 2, at 506 (calling for “narrow federal regulation only”).
190. See, e.g., Kevin Begos, Obama Fracking Support in Climate Speech
Worries Environmental Groups, HUFFINGTON POST (June 27, 2013, 5:31 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/27/obama-fracking-support_n_
3510651.html (discussing President Obama’s climate change speech in which
he expressed his support for increased use of “cleaner-burning natural gas”).
191. See generally Kennedy, supra note 44 (suggesting the “uniform enforcement of local zoning laws without special treatment for the oil and gas
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er, does not give local governments enough power to control the
fracking operation in a way that will protect their communities.
Suggestions for comprehensive state statutes, such as those
used by Pennsylvania, often work to further diminish local
192
power.
The solution proposed in this Note seeks not only to keep
preemption at bay by retaining local siting control, but also to
give local governments an active and meaningful role in the
creation of regulations that allow them to protect their communities’ unique interests. This solution builds on the cooperative
models attempted in Colorado and by the Delaware River Basin
Commission, but addresses their main weakness, which is the
lack of formal and meaningful involvement of local government
representatives in these commissions. The inclusion of local
representatives in the regulatory and permitting process is
necessary to address the consequences of fracking that have an
immediate impact on communities.
To that end, regional or state-level organizations should be
created and given regulatory authority over fracking. Such an
organization could be created by state compacts, an increasing193
ly used tool in the context of electricity transmission, by ex194
ecutive order like the Colorado Commission, by state statute,
195
or perhaps by an act of Congress, like the DRBC. Ideally, a
regional organization would align with the location of natural
gas deposits. This would encourage interstate cooperation in
many cases, allow for the creation of region-wide standards,
and bring together coalitions of local government groups that
196
have similar concerns regarding fracking.
However, given the DRBC’s lack of success in facilitating
an agreement between the member states regarding regulaindustry”); Smith, supra note 35 (arguing that local municipal control over oil
and gas activities should be preserved, pursuant to traditional zoning powers).
192. See generally Neese, supra note 146 (suggesting a comprehensive oil
and gas statute that clearly defines the balance of power between state and
local governments).
193. See Osofsky & Wiseman, Hybrid Energy, supra note 98, at 50.
194. See Neese, supra note 146, at 565.
195. See Del. River Basin Compact of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat.
688; Osofsky & Wiseman, Hybrid Energy, supra note 98, at 22 (“Rather than
continuing to litigate water disputes, the states, with Congress’s approval, entered into a compact . . . .”); About DRBC, DEL. RIVER BASIN COMM’N,
http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/about/ (last modified July 3, 2013).
196. See generally Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 477 (2011) (discussing the benefits of regional organizations to govern renewable energy development).
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tion, state-level organizations may be preferable, easier to
create, and more efficient in reaching agreements regarding the
regulation of fracking. In light of continued opposition to
fracking, states may be willing to look for avenues through
which they can quell local opposition while allowing for the development of the industry. Local officials may also prefer a
state-level organization, because there would be fewer conflicting voices and their concerns would be more readily heard. A
state-level body, created by state statute, would provide a setting that could facilitate cooperation between state and local
government.
More important than the exact geographic scope of the organization, however, is its composition. The Colorado Commission and the DRBC both fall short because neither allow the di198
rect involvement of local officials in the regulatory process. In
a new organization, there should be representatives from statelevel environmental agencies and an equal or greater number
of representatives from communities where fracking is taking
place. Preferably, these officials would have some background
in land-use planning and zoning, and understand the unique
impacts that fracking has on communities. To make the organization more manageable, each locality with fracking could appoint one representative to the organization, where a percentage of those representatives would be chosen or elected to be
part of the group that creates regulations. The remaining representatives would not be directly involved with creating regulations, but would vote on final regulations. In addition, these
representatives would be immediately involved when a permit
application for their particular locality is submitted. In this
way, the organization can utilize the knowledge that local offi199
cials have of a specific area and allow them to offer input regarding sensitive natural features, community development
concerns, and neighborhood and environmental impacts.
The composition of these organizations must also address
issues of “industry capture,” when the interests of the industry
end up controlling the creation of regulations. Concerns regarding industry capture of the Colorado Commission limits its integrity as the primary regulatory authority over gas and oil development, and calls into question this organization’s ability to

197. See supra Part II.B.2.
198. See supra Part II.B.
199. See supra Part III.A.
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represent the interests of citizens. A new organization should
be primarily composed of public representatives, as described
above. At the same time, it is clear that industry representatives often have the most up-to-date technical knowledge of oil
201
and gas operations. These individuals could therefore be involved in creating general regulations, but their voting presence should be minimal.
The primary goal of the organization should be to promulgate binding regulations, which should be continuously evaluated and modified based on new information about fracking as
it develops. This power to create binding regulations would
come through the state statute or other mechanism creating
the organization. A key goal of the organization should be to
determine when a particular regulation can be a baseline and
when a regulation must be uniform across a region or state.
Baseline regulations should be used whenever they might be
necessary to protect the unique features of local communities
202
without placing an unreasonable burden on industry. These
could include setbacks, barriers to address noise and visual impacts, and regulations regarding truck traffic and other im203
pacts on infrastructure. These are issues that should often be
addressed differently, based on the character, geography, landscape, and environmental features of a particular community.
When uniform regulations are necessary, including local governments in the process of creating and revising these regulations will help ensure that these regulations are strong and
concerns of communities are addressed.
This organization should also be given permitting authority over oil and gas development. When an application for a
permit is received, the local official from the community in
which development will take place should be involved throughout the entire permitting process to ensure the community’s
concerns are addressed. This organization will not eliminate
200. See supra Part II.B.1.
201. See Osofsky & Wiseman, Hybrid Energy, supra note 98, at 1 (noting
that private actors possess the most information regarding the technical aspects of shale gas development).
202. See Nancy D. Perkins, Principled Preemption in an Age of Interest
Convergence: Preserving the Distinction Between Pennsylvania’s Environmental Regulation and Local Land Use Regulation, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 27, 84 (2009)
(“[L]egislature[s] . . . should decide whether state standards establish a regulatory ceiling or floor, weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each option.”).
203. See supra Part I.A.
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conflict regarding the regulations, but may minimize it if local
governments feel their interests are being adequately represented.
The primary issue that will arise in the context of this type
of organization is overlapping regulation, which was a problem
204
with the DRBC. However, unlike the DRBC, which has limited jurisdiction, these organizations should have full regulatory authority over fracking. Political will is another concern, and
in places like Pennsylvania where fracking has progressed substantially, the opportunities for cooperation may be more limited. State-level officials may not want to hamper the development of natural gas, and local officials may still think that such
an organization would not go far enough to protect their interests. However, the best place to propose and experiment with
such an organization may be a state like New York or other
states where fracking is in its early stages. The government in
New York has already proved willing to listen to concerns of citizens and local governments by extending the moratorium on
fracking. Furthermore, because New York courts have upheld
local fracking bans, these bans could make it very difficult for
the state to profit from the development of natural gas resources if most or all municipalities simply enact bans. This
combination of factors may be conducive to the creation of a
new organization that gives local representatives a voice in the
regulatory process, while allowing for the development of natural gas resources. Even in other states, however, creating such
an organization could facilitate greater cooperation between
state and local governments, reducing conflict and the need for
litigation.
Ultimately, however, the atmosphere across the country
may not be supportive of the creation of such organizations, but
it is possible that this situation will change in coming years.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is conducting
a study on the effects of fracking, and is set to release a draft of
205
its findings in 2014, with the complete findings to follow. This
study may prompt renewed state and local efforts to create
strong regulations. Alternatively, the EPA itself may require
new state-wide regulations, which could aid in creating an atmosphere of greater cooperation. In addition to the possibilities
204. See supra Part II.B.2.
205. See EPA’s Study of Hydraulic Fracturing and Its Potential Impact on
Drinking Water Resources, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/hfstudy/
(last updated Aug. 21, 2013).
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of new information, the fracking boom will likely stabilize in
coming years, particularly as natural gas prices continue to
206
drop. Given the Obama Administration’s strong support for
207
fracking and the excitement surrounding home-grown energy, it is clear that fracking will not disappear. But as fracking
becomes a more normal part of our energy culture, concerned
citizens and environmentalists hope that an atmosphere for
properly addressing the short- and long-term impacts of
fracking will soon arise.
CONCLUSION
The combination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing has led to an energy revolution in the United States.
However, tapping these vast deposits of natural gas comes at a
cost to the communities located above them. In the absence of
federal regulation, state and local governments have been embroiled in legal and political disputes regarding the scope of
their respective regulatory authority. As state governments
push the boundaries of preemption, local governments are increasingly powerless to control the effects of this industry on
their communities and the environment. Although local governments have retained some power over fracking through the
court system and citizen activism, on the whole they are being
forced to sit back and watch this industry invade their communities.
The issues discussed in this Note also have applications far
beyond the fracking industry. Disputes regarding the appropriate balance of state and local control can arise in the context of
any industrial activity that has significant impacts on local
communities. Particularly when technological developments
outpace the creation of regulations, there is more reason for
communities to have concerns about the short- and long-term
effects of an industry. State preemption of local land use laws
forces local governments to bear the burdens of an industry and
denies them the ability to create regulations to protect their
communities. Although the prospect of a century’s worth of
home-grown energy is not one that should be lightly dismissed,
206. See Natural Gas Prices Drop to Lowest Level in a Decade, AM. PUBLIC
MEDIA (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/sustainability/
natural-gas-prices-drop-lowest-level-decade (reflecting a recent drop in natural
gas prices, but suggesting that fracking may not be “worth the trouble” at these prices).
207. See Begos, supra note 190.
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citizens and local governments have legitimate and substantial
concerns about the myriad of known and unknown effects of the
fracking industry. These individuals and communities must be
given a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to have their
concerns addressed
Communities need a new mechanism through which they
are given a voice in the creation of regulations to govern
fracking. Local representatives must be involved in the regulatory process because they are in the best position to understand
the unique concerns of their communities. The use of express
preemption in Pennsylvania and New York has greatly constrained local control over fracking. The attempts at cooperative models in Colorado and the Delaware River Basin have
failed to give local representatives a meaningful role in these
organizations. New regional or state-wide organizations, with
regulatory authority, should be created to bring together state
and local representatives to create and revise regulations and
issue permits. An organization which involves state and local
representatives can help to ensure that the interests of communities are represented from the day an application is filed
until the day a well is dry. These organizations will allow for
the development of natural gas resources while preserving the
ability of local governments to protect the health, safety and
welfare of their communities.

